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Abstract
The term natural experiment is used inconsistently. In one interpretation, it refers
to an experiment where a treatment is randomly assigned by someone other than the
researcher. In another interpretation, it refers to a study in which there is no controlled
random assignment, but treatment is assigned by some external factor in a way that
loosely resembles a randomized experiment—often described as an “as if random” as-
signment. In yet another interpretation, it refers to any non-randomized study that
compares a treatment to a control group, without any specific requirements on how the
treatment is assigned. I introduce an alternative definition that seeks to clarify the
integral features of natural experiments and at the same time distinguish them from
randomized controlled experiments. I define a natural experiment as a research study
where the treatment assignment mechanism (i) is neither designed nor implemented by
the researcher, (ii) is unknown to the researcher, and (iii) is probabilistic by virtue of
depending on an external factor. The main message of this definition is that the dif-
ference between a randomized controlled experiment and a natural experiment is not a
matter of degree, but of essence, and thus conceptualizing a natural experiment as a
research design akin to a randomized experiment is neither rigorous nor a useful guide to
empirical analysis. Using my alternative definition, I discuss how a natural experiment
differs from a traditional observational study, and offer practical recommendations for
researchers who wish to use natural experiments to study causal effects.
Keywords: Natural Experiment, As If Random Assignment, Exogenous Treatment As-
signment, Randomized Controlled Trials.
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The framework for the analysis and interpretation of randomized experiments is routinely
employed to study interventions that are not experimentally assigned but nonetheless share
some of the characteristics of randomized controlled trials. Research designs that study non-
experimental interventions invoking tools and concepts from the analysis of randomized ex-
periments are sometimes referred to as natural experiments. However, the use of the term has
been inconsistent both within and across disciplines.
My first goal is to introduce a definition of natural experiment that identifies its integral
features and distinguishes it clearly from a randomized experiment where treatments are as-
signed according to a known randomization procedure that results in full knowledge of the
probability of occurrence of each possible treatment allocation. I call such an experiment a
randomized controlled experiment, to emphasize that the way in which the randomness is in-
troduced is controlled by the researcher and thus results in a known probability distribution.
One of the main messages of the new definition is that the difference between a randomized
controlled experiment and a natural experiment is not a matter of degree, but of essence, and
therefore conceptualizing a natural experiment as a research design that approximates or is
akin to a randomized experiment is neither rigorous nor a useful guide to empirical analysis.
I then consider the ways in which a natural experiment in the sense of the new definition
differs from other kinds of non-experimental or observational studies. The central conclu-
sions of this discussion are that, compared to traditional observational studies where there
is no external source of treatment assignment, natural experiments (i) have the advantage of
more clearly separating pre- from post-treatment periods and thus allow for a more rigorous
falsification of its assumptions; and (ii) can offer an objective (though not directly testable)
justification for an unconfoundedness assumption.
My discussion is inspired and influenced by the conceptual distinctions introduced by
Deaton (2010) in his critique of experimental and quasi-experimental methods in development
economics (see also Deaton, forthcoming), and based on the potential outcomes framework de-
veloped by Neyman (1923 [1990]) and Rubin (1974)—see also Holland (1986) for an influential
review, and Imbens and Rubin (2015) for a comprehensive textbook.
The use of natural experiments in the social sciences was pioneered by labor economists
around the early 1990s (e.g. Angrist, 1990; Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Card and Krueger,
1994), and has been subsequently used by hundreds of scholars in multiple disciplines, including
political science. My goal is neither to give a comprehensive review of prior work based
on natural experiments, nor a historical overview of the use of natural experiments in the
social sciences. For this, I refer the reader to Angrist and Krueger (2001), Craig et al. (2017),
Dunning (2008, 2012), Meyer (1995), Petticrew et al. (2005), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000),
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and references therein. See also Abadie and Cattaneo (2018) for a recent review of program
evaluation and causal inference methods.
1 Two Examples
I start by considering two empirical examples, both of which are described by their authors
as natural experiments at least once in their manuscripts. The first example is the study by
Lassen (2005), who examines the decentralization of city government in Copenhagen, Den-
mark. In 1996, the city was divided into fifteen districts, and four of those districts were
selected to introduce a local administration for four years. The four treated districts were
selected from among the fifteen districts to be representative of the overall city in terms of var-
ious demographic and social characteristics. In 2000, a referendum was held in the entire city,
giving voters the option to extend decentralization to all districts or eliminate it altogether.
Lassen compares the referendum results of treated versus control districts to estimate the ef-
fect of information on voter turnout. The assumption is that voters in the treated districts
are better informed about decentralization than control voters; and the hypothesis tested is
that uninformed voters are more likely to abstain from voting, which at the aggregate level
should lead to an increase in voter turnout in the treated districts. Lassen (2005) considers the
assignment of districts to the decentralization/no decentralization conditions as “exogenously
determined variation” (p. 104) in whether city districts have first-hand experience with de-
centralization. Lassen (2005) then uses decentralization as an instrument for information, but
I focus exclusively on the “intention-to-treat” effect of decentralization on turnout.
The second example is Titiunik (2016), where I studied the effect of term length on leg-
islative behavior in the state senates of Texas, Arkansas, and Illinois. In these states, state
senators serve for four years and are staggered, with half of the seats up for election every two
years. Senate districts are redrawn immediately after each decennial census to comply with
the constitutionally mandated requirement that all districts have equal population. But state
constitutions also mandate that all state senate seats must be up for election immediately after
reapportionment. In order to comply with this requirement and keep seats staggered, in the
first election after reapportionment all seats are up for election but the seats are randomly as-
signed to two term-length conditions: either serve 2-years immediately after the election (and
then two consecutive 4-year terms) or serve 4-years immediately after the election (and then
one 4-year term and another 2-year term). Titiunik (2016) used the random assignment to
2-year and 4-year terms that occurred after the 2002 election under newly redrawn districts to
study the effect of shorter terms on abstention rates and bill introduction during the 2002-2003
legislative session.
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2 Two common definitions of natural experiment
The two examples presented above share a standard program evaluation setup (e.g. Abadie and Cattaneo,
2018; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), where the researcher is interested in studying the effect
of a binary treatment or intervention (decentralization, short term length) on an outcome of
interest (voter turnout, abstention rates). They also have in common that neither study was
designed by the researcher: the rules that determined which city districts had temporary de-
centralized governments or which senators served two-year terms were decided, respectively,
by the city government of Copenhagen and the state governments of Arkansas, Illinois, and
Texas—not by the researchers who published the studies. In both cases, the researcher saw
an opportunity in the allocations of these interventions to answer a question of long-standing
scientific and policy interest.
Despite their similarities, the examples have one crucial difference. In the decentralization
study by Lassen (2005), the assignment of districts to the decentralized/not-decentralized
conditions was not determined by a physical randomization device, but rather by officials
seeking to select treated districts that were representative of the city as a whole. In contrast,
the assignment of senate seats to two-year or four-year terms was based on a fixed-margins
randomization device that gave each senator the same probability of serving two or four year
terms.1
Common definitions of the term natural experiment include the researcher’s lack of control
over the treatment assignment as an integral feature. At the same time, researchers who invoke
natural experiments assume that, despite the lack of control over the assignment of the treat-
ment, some external forces of nature imbue the design with some superior credibility for causal
inference relative to other observational studies where such external factors are absent. But
current definitions of natural experiments do not explicitly describe the source of such supe-
rior credibility, other than invoking an analogy between the ‘natural-experimental’ treatment
assignment and the kind of treatment assignment that governs randomized controlled trials.
There are two ways in which this analogy is made, one is literal, and the other is figurative,
leading to two different definitions of a natural experiment.
In the literal interpretation of Gerber and Green (2012, p. 15), a natural experiment is a
situation in which there is random assignment of a treatment via a randomization device, but
this assignment is not under the control of the researcher. According to this definition, the
term length study in Titiunik (2016) is a natural experiment, but the decentralization study
1See Titiunik (2016) for details on the assignments in each state. In Texas, for example, the 35 senate seats
were allocated by creating 17 pieces of paper marked with a “2” and 18 marked with a “4”, mixing all pieces
inside a bowl, and having each of the 35 elected senators draw one piece of paper without looking.
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in Lassen (2005) is not. Other examples that conform to this definition of natural experiment
include Erikson and Stoker (2011), who use the Vietnam draft lottery to study the effect of
the military draft on political attitudes, and Bhavnani (2009), who uses a rule that randomly
reserves one third of seats to women candidates in India’s local elections to study the impact
of reservations on women’s future electoral success.2
This definition has the advantage of being precise. Understood as a randomized experiment
controlled by an external party, a natural experiment can be analyzed by directly applying the
standard tools from the analysis of randomized experiments. To be sure, the interpretation of
the estimated parameter can still pose serious challenges when the groups that the randomiza-
tion deems comparable are not directly informative about the parameter of scientific interest
(Sekhon and Titiunik, 2012).3 But interpretation issues aside, the assumptions and methods
for estimation and inference under controlled randomization are well established. Because
this definition of natural experiment is conceptually clear and its implementation relatively
uncontroversial, it is not the focus of my discussion.
Instead, my interest lies in another, widely used definition that interprets a natural ex-
periment as some sort of imperfect approximation to a randomized controlled experiment.
According to this figurative definition, a natural experiment is a situation in which an external
event introduces variation in the allocation of the treatment, and the researcher uses the ex-
ternal event as the basis to claim that the treatment is “as good as random” or “as if random,”
but no physical randomization device is employed by any human being.
Scholars who employ this notion of natural experiments do not typically offer a formal
definition of “as if randomness”, but rather refer heuristically to an analogy or comparison
with randomized experiments. Different versions of this analogy have been offered in political
science, economics, public health, and other sciences. In political science, Dunning (2008)
defines a natural experiment as a study in which the data come “from naturally occurring
phenomena” (p. 282) where the treatment is not assigned randomly but the researcher makes
“a credible claim that the assignment of the nonexperimental subjects to treatment and control
conditions is ‘as if’ random” (p. 283). In economics, Meyer (1995) defines a natural experiment
as a study that investigates “outcome measures for observations in treatment groups and
comparison groups that are not randomly assigned” (p. 151), and Angrist and Krueger (2001)
as a situation “where the forces of nature or government policy have conspired to produce
2 Gerber and Green (2012, p. 16), following Cook and Campbell (1979) and Cook, Campbell, and Shadish
(2002), use the term quasi-experiment to refer to studies such as Lassen (2005) where no actual randomization
device is employed.
3Sekhon and Titiunik (2012) consider various examples of natural experiments where this phenomenon
occurs, including the study by Bhavnani (2009) cited above.
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an environment somewhat akin to a randomized experiment” (p. 73). In public health,
Petticrew et al. (2005) define natural experiments in contrast to randomized experiments, as
designs in which “the researcher cannot control or withhold the allocation of an intervention
to particular areas or communities, but where natural or predetermined variation in allocation
occurs” (p. 752).
This definition of a natural experiment, which I shall name the ‘as-if random’ definition,
seems to be more common among empirical researchers than the definition of Gerber and Green
(2012). Most empirical researches who invoke natural experiments refer to cases where a
treatment is allocated by forces outside their control and not based on a randomization device.
3 Conceptual Distinctions
Given the widespread use of the as if random interpretation of a natural experiment, my
focus in this chapter is on research designs of this type. That is, I focus on research designs
where there is no physical randomization device controlled by a human being, but there is
some external factor that determines treatment assignment. However, I depart from the as-if
random definition of natural experiments and instead present a definition in which natural
experiments are defined in contrast to randomized experiments as opposed to akin to them.
My definition encompasses the spirit of the as-if random understanding of a natural experiment
but introduces a more rigorous understanding of the role of experimental manipulation and
random assignment, introducing conceptual distinctions that have so far remained fused. My
discussion builds most directly on prior arguments by Deaton (2010) and on several definitions
discussed by Imbens and Rubin (2015).
The case of experimentation without randomization is beyond the scope of my discus-
sion, but is worth considering at least briefly. Loosely, an experiment is a study in which
the researcher executes a direct controlled intervention over some process in order to test a
hypothesis and/or explore potential mechanisms. An experimental intervention need not be
randomly assigned, and indeed non-random experiments are ubiquitous in the natural sciences
where there is sufficient prior knowledge (such as established laws of physics) to plausibly
create a controlled environment.
Given the meaning of the term experiment, the term natural experiment seems to be an
oxymoron, since the adjective natural often refers to the researcher’s lack of control over
the treatment assignment. A controlled randomized experiment is thus a special case of an
experiment, and the opposite of an experiment is an observational study (where the researcher
is unable to experiment or control the conditions). In my proposed usage, discussed at length
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below, a natural experiment is (oxymoronically) a special case of an observational study, not
a special case of an experiment. Rather than changing established usage of these terms, in the
following pages I seek to clarify the concepts that these terms refer to.
3.1 Randomized Experiments
The first step to arrive at a precise and encompassing definition of a natural experiment requires
that we define the term randomized experiment with some precision. For this, I follow the
Neyman-Rubin potential outcomes framework (Neyman, 1923 [1990]; Rubin, 1974; Holland,
1986) and introduce standard notation. I assume that the researcher studies a population of n
units, indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and her goal is to analyze the effect of a binary intervention
or treatment Z, with Zi = 1 if i is assigned to the treatment condition Zi = 0 if i is assigned to
the control. Each unit i has two potential outcomes corresponding to each one of the treatment
conditions, with Yi(1) the outcome that i would attain under treatment and Yi(0) the outcome
that i would attain under control. The observed outcome is Yi = ZiYi(1) + (1− Zi)Yi(0), and
Xi is a vector of k covariates determined before the treatment is assigned (hereafter called
predetermined covariates). The individual-level variables are collected in the n× 1 vectors (or
n× k matrix), Y(1), Y(0), X, and Z.
This notation can be used to describe the two examples above. In the Lassen (2005) study,
the units are city districts, Zi = 1 if a district’s government is decentralized and Zi = 0
otherwise, and Yi is district-level voter turnout. In the Titiunik (2016) study, the units are
state senators, Zi = 1 if senator i serves a two-year term after redistricting and Zi = 0 if she
serves a four-year term instead, and Yi is the abstention rate or number of bills introduced
during the post-redistricting legislative session.
The vector Z = z gives the particular arrangement of treated and control units that oc-
curred. For example, if n = 5 and z = c(1, 0, 0, 1, 1), units 1, 3, and 5 were assigned to
the treatment group, and units 2 and 3 were assigned to the control. I define the assignment
mechanism Pr(Z|X,Y(1),Y(0)) as in Imbens and Rubin (2015). This function gives the prob-
ability of occurrence of each possible value of the treatment vector Z. It therefore takes values
in the interval [0, 1], and satisfies
∑
z∈{0,1}n Pr(z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) = 1 for all X,Y(0),Y(1).
From this, we can define the unit-level assignment probability pi as the sum of the prob-
abilities associated with all the assignments that result in unit i’s receiving the treatment,
pi(X,Y(0),Y(1)) =
∑
z:zi=1
Pr(z|X,Y(0),Y(1)).
Imbens and Rubin (2015) define randomized experiments in terms of restrictions placed
on the assignment mechanism. I restate some of these restrictions and their definition of
randomized experiment, which I then use as the basis of my discussion.
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The first restriction I consider requires that every unit be assigned to treatment with
probability strictly between zero and one. Formally, Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) is a probabilistic
assignment (Imbens and Rubin, 2015, p.38) if
0 < pi(X,Y(0),Y(1)) < 1 for every i, for each X,Y(0),Y(1). (1)
An assignment is probabilistic when every unit has both a positive probability of being
assigned to the treatment condition and a positive probability of being assigned to the control
condition—in other words, when all units are “at risk” of being assigned to both conditions
before the treatment is in fact assigned. Important for our purposes, a probabilistic assignment
rules out deterministic situations where, conditional on X, Y(0), and Y(1), units know with
certainty which of the two treatment conditions they will be assigned to.
Given these possible restrictions on the assignment mechanism, Imbens and Rubin (2015)
offer a definition of a randomized experiment.
Definition RE (Randomized Experiment, Imbens and Rubin 2015, p.40). A ran-
domized experiment is a study in which the assignment mechanism satisfies the following prop-
erties:
(C) Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) is controlled by the researcher and has a known functional form.
(P) Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) is probabilistic.
Several aspects of this definition are relevant for our purposes. First, the word ‘randomized’
in the definition stems from condition (P) (probabilistic assignment), while the word ‘experi-
ment’ stems from condition (C) (researcher’s knowledge and control). The researcher designs
and controls the assignment of the treatment, thus creating an experiment or controlled ma-
nipulation, and this assignment is not deterministic, in the sense that no unit can rule out
ex-ante the possibility of being assigned to one of the conditions.
None of the empirical examples introduced above satisfies this definition of a randomized
experiment, but for somewhat different reasons. In Titiunik (2016), the assignment mechanism
is both probabilistic and known, but is not under the researcher’s control and thus violates the
control part of condition (C). In Lassen (2005), both parts of condition (C) are violated, as
the researcher has neither control over the assignment mechanism nor knowledge of its exact
functional form.
Second, this definition clearly separates the notion of randomization from the notion of
“valid” comparison groups or lack of confounders, a distinction that is essential for character-
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izing natural experiments. Definition RE explicitly allows for the potential outcomes to affect
the assignment mechanism, making clear that a probabilistic assignment does not guarantee
that treated and control groups will be comparable, in the sense that it does not guarantee
that the treatment is (conditionally) independent of the potential outcomes. Such an uncon-
foundedness condition must be added as a separate requirement.
Formally, the assignment mechanism Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) is unconfounded (Imbens and Rubin,
2015, p. 38) if it satisfies
Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) = Pr(Z|X,Y(0)′,Y(1)′) for all Z,X,Y(0),Y(1),Y(0)′,Y(1)′. (2)
An unconfounded assignment is one in which the probability of each possible treatment
allocation vector is not a function of the potential outcomes. This property is violated when,
for example, units who have higher potential outcomes are more likely to be assigned to
the treatment condition than to the control even after conditioning on the available observ-
able characteristics. In general, any study where units self-select into the treatment based on
characteristics unobservable to the researcher that correlate with their potential outcomes con-
stitutes an assignment mechanism that is not unconfounded. When a randomized experiment
also satisfies unconfoundedness, Imbens and Rubin (2015) call it an unconfounded randomized
experiment.
Building on the above definitions, I now state a definition of a randomized controlled
experiment. (As I discuss below, this definition is different from Imbens and Rubin’s definition
of an unconfounded randomized experiment.)
Definition RCE (Randomized Controlled Experiment) A randomized controlled exper-
iment (RCE) is a study in which the assignment mechanism satisfies the following properties:
(D) Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) is designed and implemented by the researcher.
(K) Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) is known to the researcher.
(P) Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) is probabilistic by means of a randomization device whose physical
features ensure that Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) is unconfounded.
In a randomized controlled experiment (RCE) as I have defined it, the assignment mech-
anism is probabilistic, designed and implemented by the researcher, known to the researcher,
and not a function of the potential outcomes (possibly after conditioning on observable char-
acteristics). The latter condition means that the probability that the treatment assignment
vector Z is equal to a given z is entirely unrelated to the unit’s potential outcomes, possibly
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after we have conditioned on X. My definition of a RCE is similar to Imbens and Rubin’s
definition of an unconfounded randomized experiment, with one key difference. In the RCE
definition, condition (P) explicitly requires that unconfoundedness be a direct consequence
of the type of physical randomization device used to allocate the treatment probabilistically.
This explicitly links unconfoundedness to the randomization device.
The joint requirements of full control of the design and implementation (D), and knowledge
(K) of the assignment mechanism imply that in a RCE, the treatment assignment mechanism
is fully reproducible. In most cases, full knowledge and reproducibility of the assignment
mechanism will be a direct consequence of the researcher’s being in control of the treatment
assignment, and thus condition (K) will be implied by condition (D).
However, sometimes knowledge of the mechanism occurs despite the researcher not being
in control of the experiment, which is why I separate conditions (D) and (K) in the definition.
This occurs in experiments where, just as in a RCE, the treatment assignment is probabilistic
and unconfounded by virtue of the use of a physical randomization device, but where the design
and implementation of the assignment mechanism are not under the control of the researcher.
I shall call this type of experiment a randomized third-party experiment (RTPE).4 I define it
below for completeness.
Definition RTPE (Randomized Third-Party Experiment) A randomized third-party
experiment (RTPE) is a study in which the assignment mechanism satisfies the following prop-
erties:
(D′) Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) is designed and controlled by a third party.
(K) Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) is known to the researcher.
(P) Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) is probabilistic by means of a randomization device whose physical
features ensure that Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) is unconfounded.
3.2 Three senses of the word random
Some of the ambiguity regarding natural experiments has stemmed from the failure to properly
distinguish randomness from unconfoundedness, and mistakenly assuming that randomness in
the assignment mechanism automatically guarantees treatment and control groups that are
comparable in all relevant respects. At least part of the ambiguity seems to stem from the
different senses of the word random, which are used sometimes interchangeably to describe
both natural experiments and randomized controlled experiments.
4Others have called this a randomized policy experiment. See, for example, Clayton (2015).
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I now discuss different meanings of random and their relationship to unconfoundedness,
relying on a related distinction between externality and exogeneity introduced by Deaton
(2010) in his critique of the use of natural experiments as sources of instrumental variables
(IV). Following a terminology first adopted by Heckman, Deaton distinguishes between an
instrument being “external” to refer to variables that are determined outside the system and
“exogenous” to refer to the orthogonality condition that is needed for consistent estimation
of the parameter of interest in an IV context. My focus in this chapter is on studies where
interest lies directly on the effect of Z on Y and not on its effect via another variable, so I
ignore concerns about the exclusion restriction. However, I will show that even in this simpler
case, the distinction between the externality of Z and the type of “randomization” that such
externality creates is essential to understand the ways in which natural experiments differ from
randomized controlled experiments.
It is well known that randomized controlled experiments fail to guarantee the IV exclusion
restriction (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996). Thus, in IV settings, natural experiments and
RCEs are on a more equal footing, in the sense that neither can guarantee the assumptions to
identify the treatment effect of interest. When it comes to the “reduced form” effect of Z on
Y , however, natural experiments face unique challenges that are absent in RCEs. My interest
in this section is to discuss these particular challenges, and for this reason I focus on the
“reduced form” effect of Z on Y . However, my discussion also applies to IV settings, because
the challenges faced by natural experiments in identifying the reduced form effect remain when
natural experiments are used as a “source of instruments” (Angrist and Krueger, 2001, p. 73).
I consider three different uses of the term “random”, all of which have been used to charac-
terize natural experiments—though I do not mean to imply that these are the only three ways
in which the term random has been used in the history of science. The first is what I call the
colloquial definition of random; this is the first sense listed by the Merriam-Webster dictio-
nary, which defines the adjective random as “lacking a definite plan, purpose, or pattern” and
further clarifies that this use “stresses lack of definite aim, fixed goal, or regular procedure.”
Used in this sense, a random treatment assignment refers to an assignment mechanism that
follows an arbitrary, inscrutable plan that has no clear pattern.
The notion of inscrutability behind the colloquial sense of random is similar to the concept
of Knightian uncertainty in economics. In his seminal study, Knight (1921) used the term
risk to refer to the kind of uncertainty that is measurable and quantifiable with objective
probabilities, and reserved the term uncertainty to refer to situations where the randomness
cannot be objectively quantified and thus cannot be insured in the market. A similar distinction
was advanced by Keynes (1921), see the discussion in LeRoy and Singell Jr (1987).
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The second meaning of the word random is most likely found in statistics textbooks. This
sense of random, which I call the statistical definition of random, refers to situations in which
we have uncertainty about what event will occur, but we can precisely characterize all possible
events that may occur and exactly quantify the probability with which each event will occur
(analogous to Knightian risk). In this sense, a random treatment assignment is an assignment
of units to treatment and control conditions in which the uncertainty can be completely and
exactly quantified via the function Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)), which specifies the probability of
occurrence of each possible treatment allocation. Used in the statistical sense, randomization
thus refers to “the selection of an element a, from a set A, according to some probability
distribution P on A” (Berger, 1990).
In his treatise on experimental design, Fisher (1935) explicitly rejects the colloquial sense
of random in his definition of a randomized experiment. While discussing an agricultural
experiment that assigns land plots to various crops to test the relative yield of each crop
variety, Fisher is explicit in ruling out haphazardness or arbitrariness.
“In each block, the five plots are assigned one to each of the five varieties under
the test, and this assignment is made at random. This does not mean that the
experimenter writes down the names of the varieties, or letters standing for them,
in any order that may occur to him, but that he carries out a physical experimental
process of randomisation, using means which shall ensure that each variety has an
equal chance of being tested on any particular plot of ground.” (Fisher, 1935, p.51)
The above passage suggests yet a third sense of random, which is in fact a particular case
of the statistical definition. This third definition equates randomness with a situation in which
all possible outcomes are equally likely. This is the sense used by Fisher in the passage above,
and even more explicitly described in Fisher (1956) when he discusses random throws of a die:
“(...) we may think of a particular throw, or of a succession of throws, as a random
sample from the aggregate, which is in this sense subjectively homogeneous and
without recognizable stratification.” (Fisher, 1956, p. 35, emphasis in the original)
When used in this third sense, a random assignment mechanism refers to a mechanism that
gives every single possible arrangement of treated and control units the same probability of
occurrence. For example, if an assignment mechanism allocates exactly nt units to treatment
and n− nt units to control, it is random in this sense if Pr(Z = z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) = 1/
(
n
nt
)
for
all z. I call this the equiprobable sense of random.
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In sum, the three senses of random refer to three different kinds of uncertainty. The
colloquial sense means uncertainty that is arbitrary and inscrutable, not amenable to charac-
terization by a clear pattern. The statistical sense of random refers to uncertainty that can
be precisely characterized by a known probability distribution. And the equiprobable sense
of random is a particular case of the statistical sense, and refers to uncertainty that is char-
acterized by a known probability distribution that assigns equal probability to each possible
outcome.
The ambiguous and overlapping usage of the term random is why defining a natural ex-
periment as having an ‘as if’ random treatment assignment lacks statistical rigor. If random
is used in the colloquial sense, then the ‘as if’ qualifier is not needed and distorts meaning,
as random in the colloquial sense already refers to an arbitrary/inscrutable assignment. If
random is used in the statistical sense, the ‘as if’ qualifier is simply incorrect. The assignment
vector Z is a random variable, and as such it has some distribution over the sample space of
assignments. Used in the statistical sense, a natural experiment has an exact random assign-
ment, not an ‘as if’ random assignment. Finally, used in the equiprobable sense, a natural
experiment is typically not random at all: earthquakes are more likely to destroy huts than
concrete buildings, rain on election day is more likely in Seattle than in Arizona, and abortion
restriction laws are more likely to be passed in conservative than liberal states.
3.3 Random assignment does not imply probabilistic assignment
An assignment mechanism that is random in either the statistical or the equiprobable sense
need not be probabilistic in the sense of equation (1). For example, neither the statistical nor
the equiprobable definition of random rules out a treatment assignment mechanism in which all
units are assigned to treatment with probability one. This point is trivially true—a constant is
a special case of a random variable in which all the probability mass is accumulated at a single
value—but it matters for our purposes. Of course, since random assignment is usually discussed
in the context of evaluating the effects of receiving a treatment relative to not receiving it,
the existence of a comparison group in this context is presupposed. This is why Fisher does
not explicitly include probabilistic in his definition of random, but it is clear that he does so
implicitly. Informally, the requirement that the assignment be probabilistic is essential if our
purpose is to obtain comparable treated and control units; otherwise, the treatment assignment
may be perfectly correlated with confounders.5
5See Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) for a formal characterization of the bias introduced by violations
of a probabilistic assignment in the context of selection on observables, which also applies immediately to
stratified randomized experiments. If the assignment is deterministic for units with certain characteristics
X = x, this introduces a lack of common support that impedes obtaining valid causal effects even if the
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The colloquial sense of random does rule out the particular deterministic assignment that
assigns every unit to treatment (or to control), since in this case a very clear pattern of
assignment would be discernible. However, other forms of non-probabilistic assignments are
still compatible with the colloquial notion of randomness. For example, Fisher’s farmer could
decide that plots on the edge of the property line will always be assigned to the same crop.
This decision would be entirely arbitrary, thus satisfying the colloquial definition of random.
Moreover, to the external observer, this non-probabilistic assignment would be hard to catch,
unless she happens to measure the proportion of boundary plots in treatment versus control
groups. This point turns out to be important: in natural experiments, since the assignment
mechanism is unknown to the researcher, she will not be able to distinguish probabilistic
from deterministic assignments, because the assignment could be deterministic conditional on
a characteristic that is unobserved to the researcher—which would give the appearance of a
probabilistic assignment.
A probabilistic assignment is therefore an assignment that is random in the statistical sense,
with the added restriction that the probability distribution that characterizes the randomness
not assign extreme (i.e., zero or one) individual probabilities.
3.4 Random Assignment Does not Imply Unconfoundedness
In a randomized experiment as stated in Definition RE, no unit has perfect control over which
treatment it receives, in the sense that all units have ex-ante probability of being assigned to
both the treated and control conditions. The assignment is therefore random in the statistical
sense, governed by Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)). However, a probabilistic assignment does not imply
an unconfounded assignment.
This point is easy to see in terms of our decentralization example. Imagine that in the
Lassen (2005) study, some city districts have high crime, and reducing crime is the top priority
of government administrators. Imagine also that decentralization gives districts more precise
tools to combat and reduce crime. To say that the assignment is probabilistic or “randomized”
is to say, for example, that districts lack the ability to perfectly and precisely self-select into the
decentralization treatment which they believe will result in the most effective crime reduction.
But this does not mean that high-crime districts have the same probability of being decentral-
ized than low-crime districts. Perhaps officials from high-crime areas forcefully express their
strong preference for decentralization to city administrators, and this results in their having a
larger probability of receiving the treatment than low-crime areas. A probabilistic assignment
only means that this probability is not one (nor zero); it does not mean that different types
assignment is unconfounded.
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of units have the same probability of receiving treatment. If assignments with decentralized
high-crime areas are more likely than assignments with decentralized low-crime areas, a naive,
unadjusted comparison of treated versus control outcomes will not yield a valid estimate of
the average effect of decentralization. A valid comparison requires that we reweight or stratify
the observations based on the different probabilities of receiving treatment, something that is
easy to do if we know the exact functional form of Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) but entirely unfeasible
if this assignment mechanism is unknown.
One way to think of a confounded assignment is to see it as a blocked randomized exper-
iment in which different “types” of individuals defined by potential outcomes are assigned to
treatment with different probabilities. For example, imagine that all units have the same poten-
tial outcome under control, Yi(0) = y0 for all i. Defining high-types as units with Yi(1)−y0 > 0
and low-types as units with Yi(1)− y0 ≤ 0, we can conceive of a randomized experiment that
violates unconfoundeness as a blocked randomized experiment where high-types are assigned
to treatment with higher probability than low-types, and types are unobservable to the re-
searcher. It is well known that the proper analysis of a stratified randomized experiment
with treatment assignment probabilities that vary by strata requires accounting for the differ-
ent strata, which in turn requires knowing the strata to which every unit belongs (see, e.g.,
Athey and Imbens, 2017; Gerber and Green, 2012; Imbens and Rubin, 2015). In this example,
failing to account for the different strata would over-estimate the true average treatment effect.
In general, obtaining valid conclusions from an unconfounded block-randomized experiment is
not feasible when the strata remain hidden from the researcher. In other words, chance does
not imply comparability.
Finally, note that randomness in the equiprobable sense does imply unconfoundedness. An
assignment mechanism that is equiprobable is also unconfounded: any assignment that gives
each vector z the same probability of being chosen is by construction attaching a constant
probability to each z, which as a consequence cannot be a function of the potential outcomes.
But the converse is not true: an unconfounded assignment mechanism does not imply that each
possible treatment assignment vector z must be equally likely. For example, a mechanism that
uses a random device to allocate 2/3 of women and 1/3 of men to treatment is unconfounded,
but is not random in the equiprobable sense when all units are considered as a whole (though
it is equiprobable within gender blocks). An equiprobable random assignment mechanism is
perhaps the simplest way to ensure an unconfounded assignment, which may be why the term
“random assignment” is often used as a synonym for unconfoundedness.
14
3.5 Physical Devices that Ensure Unconfoundedness
Because a probabilistic assignment mechanism does not imply that the mechanism is uncon-
founded, it follows that the superior credibility of RCEs does not stem exclusively from random
chance. Although chance or uncertainty are needed to ensure condition (P) in the RCE defi-
nition, chance alone is not enough to bestow an experiment with the ability to identify causal
effects. Somewhat counter-intuitively, part of the power of randomized experimentation lies
not in the creation of uncertainty, but rather in the use of physical randomization devices
that are capable of assigning treatments without being influenced by the units’ potential out-
comes. These devices are more than the means by which the end of probabilistic assignment is
achieved; they ensure that chance is introduced in a way that ensures identification of causal
effects and the quantification of uncertainty. Without a physical randomization device that
ensures knowledge of the probability distribution of the assignment mechanism, chance is not
necessarily helpful.
To see this, consider the following strategies to introduce a probabilistic treatment assign-
ment. We could stack paper applications on a desk and blow a fan at them, and then assign
to treatment the applications that fall to the floor. Or we could have an octopus select appli-
cations,6 or let Fisher’s farmer choose the applications “in any order that may occur to him”.
All of these strategies would be random in the colloquial sense. It might also be plausible
to assume that all of these strategies would lead to a probabilistic assignment in the sense
that, a priori, all applications would have a nonzero chance of being selected for treatment and
for control—though this may be difficult to verify. However, it would be premature to claim
that the assignment is unconfounded. For example, if the original pile of applications on the
table were sorted alphabetically with Z at the bottom and A at the top, and the wind was
more likely to blow away top applications, we would have more names in the A-L part of the
alphabet assigned to treatment than to control. Since, for example, ethnicity often correlates
strongly with last name, our treatment and control groups would very likely differ on ethnicity,
and as a result on any other observable and unobservable that may correlate with it, such as
immigration status, parent’s education, neighborhood of residence, etc. Of course, in this case
we would also have a hard time figuring out the exact functional form of Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)).
The randomness introduced by a physical randomization device is crucially different from
the randomness of a fan or an octopus. By a physical randomization device, I mean a device
and a set of rules that allow a researcher to introduce randomness with a known probability
distribution function—that is, in a controlled way.
6For an octopus-based assignment mechanism, see the case of Paul the psychic of Oberhausen, e.g.
https://www.bbc.com/news/10420131.
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Examples of such physical randomization devices are varied. Fisher (1935) describes a
device based on a deck of cards for an agricultural experiment in which five plots of land
are to be assigned randomly to five fertilizer varieties. Cards are numbered from 1 to 100
and repeatedly shuffled so that they are arranged in random order; the five treatments are
numbered 1 through 5; and the experimenter draws one card for every plot. The fertilizer
assigned to the plot is the remainder obtained when the number on the drawn card is divided
by 5 if the number is not a multiple of 5; if it is, the plot is assigned to fertilizer 5. This
procedure guarantees that the each fertilizer variety corresponds to 20 cards; since there 100
cards, the probability that each plot is assigned to each of the fertilizer varieties is 1/5.
Another randomization device is a rotating lottery drum where the researcher deposits
balls or tickets containing numbers representing each of the experimental units. The balls or
tickets are drawn after rotating the drum, ensuring that at any point each of the remaining
balls has the same probability of being selected. This procedure was used, for example, to
assign each one of the integers between 1 and 366 to each one of the possible birth dates in a
year (including February 29) to select who would be drafted to the Vietnam War, the numbers
1 through 366 indicating the order in which men would be drafted. (The Vietnam lottery,
however, seems to have failed to produce equally likely outcomes; see discussion below.)
In scientific studies conducted today, the most common mechanism to allocate treatments
randomly is based on computer-generated pseudo-random numbers. The principles underlying
the generation of pseudo-random numbers offer important lessons for our discussion. Pseudo-
random numbers can be generated in multiple ways, but all of them share the characteristic of
being entirely predictable, directly ruling out the colloquial definition of random. For example,
the Lehmer linear congruential algorithm (Lehmer, 1951; Park and Miller, 1988) requires the
choice of a prime modulus m, an integer a ∈ 2, 3, . . . , m− 1, and an initial value x0. The value
x1 is generated as x1 = ak where k ≡ x0 mod m is the remainder when x0 is divided by m;
and all subsequent values are generated as xi+1 = axi mod m. Given the initial value x0, the
entire sequence is entirely determined, which illustrates the fundamental distinction between
the colloquial and the statistical definition of random, lucidly summarized by Park and Miller:
Over the years many programmers have unwittingly demonstrated that it is all
too easy to ‘hack’ a procedure that will produce a strange looking, apparently un-
predictable sequence of numbers. It is fundamentally more difficult, however, to
write quality software which produces what is really desired—a virtually infinite
sequence of statistically independent random numbers, uniformly distributed be-
tween 0 and 1. This is a key point: strange and unpredictable is not necessarily
random. (Park and Miller, 1988, p.1193)
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Formally demonstrating that randomization devices do in fact produce an equidistributed
sequence of numbers is difficult, both because the physical properties of certain random-
ization devices can be complex (e.g. Aldous and Diaconis, 1986) and because demonstrating
(and even defining) the randomness of a sequence is a hard mathematical problem (see,e.g.,
Downey and Hirschfeldt, 2010; Pincus and Singer, 1996; Pincus and Kalman, 1997). Nonethe-
less, with our current knowledge of mathematics and algorithmic randomness, several random-
ization devices such as pseudo-random number generators or sufficiently shuffled cards are in
fact able to produce independent, uniformly distributed numbers. I refer to such devices as
proper randomization devices, to distinguish them from randomization devices that appear
but ultimately fail to produce equidistributed sequences.
The feature that proper randomization devices have in common is that (i) the allocation of
units to the treatment/control conditions that they produce are entirely determined by their
physical and statistical properties, which are by construction unrelated to the units’ potential
outcomes and thus result in an unconfounded assignment mechanism; and (ii) these properties
are known and well understood, which in turn implies that the assignment mechanism is
entirely known and thus reproducible. Thus, proper physical randomization devices not only
ensure that there is an element of chance in which unit receives treatment but also, by their very
properties, they simultaneously guarantee that the assignment mechanism is unconfounded
(and known).
The use of a proper physical randomization device is as fundamental in its role to ensure
unconfoundedeness as in its role to ensure random chance. We could introduce chance in treat-
ment assignment using fans, octopus, or earthquakes. But only a fully known and reproducible
physical randomization device can guarantee that this randomness can be used as the basis
for inference and identification.
This guarantee, however, is not bullet proof. There are numerous and notable examples
where the physical properties of randomization devices failed to produce unconfounded as-
signments because they were mistakenly believed to be proper devices. For example, the
implementation of the 1970 Vietnam lottery is believed to have been defective (the capsules
not sufficiently mixed), assigning systematically lower numbers to birth dates in later months,
contrary to the uniform distribution that the lottery drum was supposed to produce (see, e.g.,
Fienberg, 1971). This is a case where the physical properties of the device were mistakenly
believed to produce an equiprobable assignment. For another example, see the Lanarkshire
milk experiment (Student, 1931).
Such “failures of randomization” can invalidate a RCE, unless the true probabilities in-
duced by the defective randomization device can be learned or discovered. However, note
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that in the case of the Vietnam lottery, researchers were able to detect the departure from
an equiprobable assignment precisely because they believed that the physical randomization
device guaranteed such an assignment, and because an equiprobable assignment has objective
empirical implications (similar number of observations per birth month, etc.). This ability to
detect departures from a known randomization distribution is only possible when such distri-
bution can be specified ex-ante. It is precisely because we believe that the Vietnam lottery
drums should have produced a uniform assignment that we discover that something must have
been wrong with the device (or with our beliefs about the device).
In contrast, in natural experiments, because we fundamentally ignore the distribution of the
external assignment mechanism, we have no way of using the observed assignment to validate
our beliefs about the physical randomization device used by nature.
4 An Alternative Definition of Natural Experiment
The key feature of the as-if random interpretation of a natural experiment is the existence of
an external factor or phenomenon that governs the allocation of treatment among units. This
external phenomenon is most commonly ruled by the laws of nature (earthquakes, hurricanes,
etc.) or the laws of government (minimum age restrictions, voting rules, etc.), and results in a
treatment assignment that has been variously described as haphazard (Rosenbaum, 2002), as-
if random (Dunning, 2008), naturally occurring (Rutter, 2007), not according to any particular
order (Gould, Lavy, and Paserman, 2004), serendipitous (DiNardo, 2016; Rosenzweig and Wolpin,
2000), unanticipated (Carbone, Hallstrom, and Smith, 2006), unpredictable (Dunning, 2012),
unplanned (Lalive and Zweimu¨ller, 2009), quasi-random (Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Hassan, 2016),
or a shock (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti, 2004).
As discussed above, an arbitrary and unpredictable treatment assignment implies neither
unconfoundedness nor knowledge (and thus reproducibility) of the assignment mechanism—
two distinctive features of randomized controlled experiments. For this reason, I introduce
a definition of a natural experiment that preserves the externality of the treatment assign-
ment mechanism but, in contrast to prior interpretations, emphasizes its non-experimental
qualities rather than its “as-if randomness”. In my definition, the external phenomenon that
governs treatment assignment ensures (in successful cases) that the assignment mechanism is
probabilistic, but not that it is unconfounded.
I first distinguish randomized controlled experiments from observational studies, and then
define a natural experiment as a particular case of an observational study. For this, I consider
two dimensions. The first is whether the researcher is in control of the design and implemen-
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tation of the experiment. The second dimension is whether the probabilities associated with
each possible treatment allocation are known. The four possible combinations of these two
criteria are illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1: Typology of randomized experiments and observational studies
Probabilities known to researcher
Yes No
Designed & implemented Yes Randomized controlled experiment (RCE)
Observational study
by the researcher No Randomized third-party experiment (RTPE)
Given a probabilistic treatment assignment, the difference between a randomized experi-
ment and a non-experimental design depends crucially on both knowledge and control of the
assignment mechanism. When a researcher controls the design and implementation of a prob-
abilistic treatment assignment, she has full knowledge of all the probabilities associated with
each possible treatment allocation. As a consequence, the randomization procedure is fully
known and reproducible. This combination, represented by the top-left corner of Table 1,
corresponds to RCEs as defined above. The rows of the table correspond exactly with condi-
tion (D) in the definition of a RCE. Condition (P) in the definition is satisfied implicitly if we
assume that when a researcher designs and controls the assignment, she chooses a probabilistic
assignment.7 And the unconfoundedness assumption (U) is implied by the assumption that
the treatment allocation probabilities are fully known.8
Being in charge of the design and implementation of the randomized experiment, however, is
a not a necessary condition to having full knowledge of the assignment mechanism. Researchers
often discover randomized experiments that are designed and implemented by third parties
such as policy makers. In some cases, the third party is willing to disclose all details regarding
the assignment mechanism, and as a consequence all probabilities of treatment assignment
become known to the researcher despite her not being in direct control of the experiment. In
Definition RTPE, I called this a randomized third-party experiment (RTPE). RTPEs belong in
7If her assignment has pi ∈ {0, 1} for some units, the parameter of interest can always be redefined for those
units whose probabilities are neither zero nor one.
8For example, if a researcher uses a higher probability of treatment assignment for patients who are known
to benefit the most from treatment, this would appear to violate the unconfoundedness assumption. However,
since we are assuming that the researcher designed the experiment, she would know and be able to reproduce
all treatment assignment probabilities for every unit, thus making the high/low potential benefit strata fully
observable, which would restore unconfoundedness (conditional on potential benefit). Even if all units are as-
signed to treatment with a different probability and there are no strata, knowing these probabilities is sufficient
to consistently estimate the average treatment effect, and perform exact Fisherian inference based on the sharp
null hypothesis. As long as all probabilities are fully known, the possibility of violating unconfoundedness does
not arise, or is inconsequential.
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the bottom-left cell of Table 1, where probabilities are known but the experiment is either not
designed or not implemented by the researcher, or possibly both. If the treatment assignment
mechanism is known, then even when the researcher is not in control of the assignment as
in Titiunik (2016), well-defined treatment effects are identifiable, inference methods for the
analysis of randomized experiments are ensured to be valid, and assumptions are falsifiable.
Regardless of who designs and implements the experiment, if the probabilities associated
with each possible treatment allocation are unknown to the researcher, the design is non-
experimental—also known as an “observational study”. My definition of an observational
study follows Imbens and Rubin (2015), who define it as a study in which “the functional form
of the assignment mechanism is unknown” (p. 41). In contrast to a RTPE, where the lack of
direct design or implementation is accompanied by knowledge of the probability occurrence of
each treatment allocation, in an observational study the researcher fundamentally ignores or
has no access to these probabilities.
In practice, cases that belong to the top-right of Table 1 cell are rare because a randomized
experiment that is designed and implemented by the researcher typically implies that the
treatment assignment mechanism is fully known to the researcher. However, there might be
cases where the researcher controls the treatment assignment, but either the design or the
implementation is faulty and as a consequence the exact treatment allocation probabilities
are unknown—examples include the Vietnam lottery and the Lanarkshire milk experiment
mentioned above.
Given the above distinctions, I now introduce a new definition of natural experiment.
Definition NE (Natural Experiment) A natural experiment is a study in which the as-
signment mechanism satisfies the following properties:
(D˜) Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) is neither designed nor implemented by the researcher.
(K˜) Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) is unknown to the researcher.
(P˜ ) Pr(Z|X,Y(0),Y(1)) is probabilistic by virtue of an external event or intervention that is
outside the experimental units’ direct control.
This definition is intentionally analogous to my prior definitions of a RCE and a RTPE, to
facilitate a comparison. A natural experiment is a research design where the researcher is nei-
ther in charge of the design of the treatment assignment mechanism nor of its implementation
(condition D˜). Moreover, the treatment assignment mechanism is unknown (condition K˜),
which means that the researcher does not know and has no way of knowing the probabilities
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associated with each possible treatment allocation. The latter condition—assignment mecha-
nism unknown—immediately implies that a natural experiment is an observational study.
The third and last condition in the definition (P˜ ) captures what has often been invoked
as the main feature of a natural experiment: its unpredictability as a result of the assignment
mechanism’s dependence on an external factor. A natural experiment is a special kind of
observational study where the mechanism that allocates treatment is known to depend on an
external factor. In my definition, this external factor is assumed to be the source of randomness
that results in a probabilistic assignment mechanism, and thus captures the unpredictable
component that has been emphasized in prior characterizations of natural experiments.
Note that condition P˜ is not directly verifiable or falsifiable. Although the existence of
the external factor will typically be immediately verifiable, verifying that this external factor
resulted in a probabilistic assignment will be considerably more difficult and often impossible.
Thus, classifying an observational study as a natural experiment will require assuming that
the external forces of nature that intervened in the assignment of treatment did so in such
a way as to produce a probabilistic assignment. The justification of this assumption will
often rest on the argument that the experimental units have no ability to directly control the
external factor, and thus have no ability to choose their treatment condition deterministically.
This is a heuristic rather than a formal argument, as the units’ lack of control of their own
assignment is not by itself sufficient to ensure a probabilistic assignment—rather, the lack of
control introduced by the external factor is simply used as the basis for assuming that the
assignment was governed, at least partly, by chance.
In a standard observational study, it is often impossible for the researcher to know which,
if any, of the units that actually took the treatment were ex-ante at risk of not taking it. In
contrast, in a natural experiment, there is an external factor that serves as the basis for making
such assumption. Although the probability of receiving treatment is still possibly a function of
potential outcomes, it is also affected by an external factor over which the units have no precise
control. For example, even though families can choose to invest on more durable construction
materials to protect against earthquakes or floods, the severity of natural disasters is not under
any family’s control and thus it is impossible for a family to precisely and perfectly guarantee
that their house will not be destroyed by a natural disaster, which introduces an element of
chance to which houses are in fact destroyed. The distinction is similar to that introduced by
Lee (2008) between “systematic or predictable components that can depend on individuals’
attributes and/or actions” and a “random chance component” that is uncontrollable from the
point of view of the unit (Lee, 2008, p. 681).
Crucially, the externality is not absolute, but relative to the units who are receiving the
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treatment. This external factor implies that the units that are assigned to treatment or control
lack precise control over the treatment condition they will receive, and thus that the treatment
assignment mechanism is not fully under the control of the units who are the subjects of the
study. Thus, external means “external to units”, not necessarily to other actors.
For example, in the Lassen (2005) study, the assignment of districts to the decentralization
condition depended on various factors. Some of those factors are units’ characteristics such
as population size and suburban status. These are examples of characteristics X that may be
correlated with the units’ potential outcomes and determined before the treatment is assigned.
But Lassen’s account of the decision process that governed the decentralization policy suggests
that, despite their different characteristics, all the districts in the sample were at risk of
being assigned to the decentralization group. The assumption of probabilistic assignment is
supported by the policymakers’ account of how the decentralization policy was carried out.
However, even if condition (P˜ ) holds and the assignment is in fact probabilistic by virtue
of the external factor, there remains a crucial obstacle. The central distinction between a
RCE or RTPE and a natural experiment as I have defined it is that, in a natural experiment,
the exact probabilities with which each possible treatment allocation could have occurred are
fundamentally unknown. Thus, even if the external factor prevents the experimental units
from having precise control over which treatment condition they receive, the researcher has
fundamental uncertainty about the actual probabilities associated with each allocation. Thus,
a research design that satisfies Definition NE is still insufficient to identify or make inferences
about causal effects, and researchers need to invoke additional assumptions. I elaborate on
this issue in the following two sections, after discussing the particular case of the regression
discontinuity design.
Is the Regression Discontinuity Design a Natural Experiment?
I now discuss whether definition NE applies to the regression discontinuity (RD) design, a re-
search design that has become widely used throughout the social and behavioral sciences (for an
overview see Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik, 2019 and Cattaneo, Titiunik, and Vazquez-Bare
2020). Part of the popularity of the RD design stems from the idea that the RD treatment as-
signment resembles the assignment in RCEs, and thus its credibility is similar to the credibility
of an actual experiment. The notion of “as if random” or “akin to random” appears frequently
in discussions of RD designs, which suggests that any general discussion surrounding natural
experiments should apply to RD designs in particular.
A RD design is a study in which all units receive a score (also known as running variable),
and a treatment is allocated according to a specific rule that depends on the unit’s score and a
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known cutoff. In the simplest, binary treatment case, the rule assigns the treatment condition
to units whose score is above the cutoff and assigns the control condition to units whose
score is below it. Letting Ri be the score for units i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and r0 be the cutoff, each
unit’s treatment assignment is Ti = 1(Ri ≥ r0). This rule implies that, conditional on R, the
treatment assignment is deterministic, since P(Ti = 1|Ri ≥ r0) = 1 and P(Ti = 1|Ri < r0) = 0.
All RD designs rely on this discontinuous change in the probability of treatment assignment
to study the effect of the treatment at the cutoff, under the assumption that this probability
is the only relevant feature of the data generating process that changes discontinuously at the
cutoff—or, more precisely, under the assumption that the distribution (or expectation) of the
units’ potential outcomes is continuous at the cutoff.
A canonical RD example, first introduced by Lee (2008), is one in which the treatment of
interest is winning an election, and the score is the vote share obtained by a political party.
Under plurality rules with only two candidates, the party wins the election if it obtains 50%
of the vote or more, and it loses otherwise. Although districts where the party wins will not in
general be comparable to districts where the party loses, one interpretation of the RD design
poses that in districts where the election is very close, chance plays a role in deciding the
ultimate winner.
Some scholars have claimed that the RD treatment assignment rule induces variation in the
treatment assignment that is as good as the variation induced by a randomized controlled ex-
periment, elevating RD designs above most other observational studies. The analogy between
RD designs and randomized experiments has been invoked frequently to justify the classifica-
tion of the RD design as an almost-experiment and its treatment assignment as “as if random”.
DiNardo (2016, p. 7) observes that “if we focus our attention on the difference in outcomes
between ‘near winners’ and ‘near losers’ such a contrast is formally equivalent to a randomized
controlled trial if there is at least some ‘random’ component to the vote share.” Lee (2008,
p. 676) argues that “causal inferences from RD designs can sometimes be as credible as those
drawn from a randomized experiment”, while Lee and Lemieux (2010) call RD designs the
“close cousins” of randomized experiments.
These analogies between RD designs and randomized experiments are based on the role
of unpredictability in the final treatment assignment. Dunning (2012) sees unpredictability
as the source of comparability, asserting that “given the role of unpredictability and luck in
exam performance, students just above and below the key threshold should be very similar,
on average.” Lee (2008) also views uncertainty as the source of comparability, asserting that
“Even on the day of an election, there is inherent uncertainty about the precise and final vote
count. In light of this uncertainty, the local independence result predicts that the districts
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where a party’s candidate just barely won an election (...) are likely to be comparable in all
other ways to districts where the party’s candidate just barely lost the election” (Lee, 2008,
p.676-77).
The RD design fits the definition of a natural experiment that I introduced above. Its
assignment mechanism is typically neither designed nor controlled by the researcher. Moreover,
although it seems that the RD treatment rule T = 1(R ≥ r0) makes the assignment mechanism
fully known, it is only known conditional on R. Given a unit’s score value, the researcher knows
whether the probability of being assigned to treatment was zero or one. However, the researcher
fundamentally ignores the probability distribution of the score R, which implies that, in any
window around the cutoff, certain types of individuals could have been more likely than others
to receive a score above the cutoff. If types correlate with potential outcomes, then units
barely above and barely below the cutoff will not be comparable unless we condition on type.
Sekhon and Titiunik (2017) discuss this point at length, and show that random assignment of
the RD score in a neighborhood of the cutoff does not imply that the potential outcomes and
the treatment are statistically independent, nor that the potential outcomes are unrelated to
the score in this neighborhood.
This distinction is analogous to the distinction between probabilistic and unconfounded
assignment. The element of chance contained in the ultimate value of the score that a unit
receives implies that the assignment mechanism is probabilistic. Consider a RD design where
a scholarship is given to students whose grade in an exam is above a known threshold. Even
good students can see their exam performance adversely affected by ambient noise, unexpected
illnesses, or unreasonably hard questions. This means the there is an element of chance in the
ultimate grade that any student receives. This element of chance, in combination with the RD
rule, implies that a student’s placement above or below the cutoff is a random variable. Its
probability distribution, however, is fundamentally unknown to the researcher.
Observing the scores assigned to the units in a RD design is analogous to observing the
treatment status of each unit in an experiment where the probability of treatment assign-
ment of each unit is hidden from or unknown to the researcher. This means that if we
adopt a local randomization approach to RD designs (Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik, 2015;
Cattaneo, Titiunik, and Vazquez-Bare, 2017; Cattaneo, Idrobo, and Titiunik, 2020), where we
focus on a window or neighborhood around the cutoff and use units whose scores are below
the cutoff as a comparison group for treated units whose scores are above it, it is natural to
imagine that treated units with Ri = r0 + ǫ could have instead received a score Ri = r0 − ǫ
and thus could have been assigned to the control group. It therefore seems plausible to assume
that the treatment assignment in a small window around the cutoff is probabilistic, and it is
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probabilistic by virtue of the unpredictable components of R, in combination with the external
RD rule T = 1(R ≥ r0). This implies that the RD design satisfies the definition of natural
experiment that I have proposed.
My conclusion concurs with DiNardo’s (2016) and Dunning’s (2012) characterization of the
RD design as a natural experiment, but for different reasons. While these authors see the RD
design as akin to an experiment, my understanding of the RD as a natural experiment stems
from its status as an observational study where an external rule justifies the assumption that
the treatment assignment is probabilistic. Understanding RD designs as natural experiments in
the sense of definition NE separates the notion of chance from the notion of comparability: the
probabilistic nature of the RD assignment implies neither that the RD assignment mechanism
is known, nor that it is equiprobable.
5 Advantages of Natural Experiments over Traditional
Observational Studies
A natural experiment is fundamentally different from a randomized controlled experiment be-
cause its treatment assignment mechanism is unknown to the researcher. For this reason, in
the hierarchy of credibility of research designs for program evaluation, natural experiments
rank below randomized controlled experiments.9 At the same time, the most convincing nat-
ural experiments rank above other observational studies where the assignment mechanism is
not known to depend on a verifiable external factor. The reason is that natural experiments,
by virtue of the assignment’s dependence on this external factor, offer clear guidelines to dis-
tinguish a pre-treatment from a post-treatment period. Moreover, in some cases, the external
factor in natural experiments offers a plausible claim of unconfoundedness.
I shall refer to an observational study where no external factor is known to affect treatment
assignment as a traditional observational study. As an example of such a study, I consider the
influential analysis of the determinants of political participation by Brady, Verba, and Schlozman
(1995). These authors propose a resource theory of political participation that expands the
traditional socio-economic status (SES) model which focused on income and education as
determinants of political participation. Their expanded model is centered in three types of
resources: time, money, and civic skills. Their hypothesis is that the amount of each of these
three resources available to an individual has a positive effect on that individual’s political
participation.
9Deaton and Cartwright (2018) (and see also Deaton, 2010, forthcoming) reject the idea that research
designs can be ranked in terms of credibility. In response, Imbens (2010) argues that such a ranking is possible
in a ceteris paribus sense (see also Imbens, 2018).
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The data come from a representative telephone survey of the United States’ adult popula-
tion that collected self-reported data on respondents’ political and civic participation, and also
demographic and economic characteristics. Both the outcome (political participation) and the
treatment of interest (time, money, and civic skills) are measured with data from this survey.
In particular, money resources are measured as self-reported family income; civic skills are
measured with educational attainment questions, a vocabulary test, and self-reported partic-
ipation in nonpolitical organizations such as churches and schools; and time is measured as
the hours left in an average day after subtracting time spent sleeping, working, studying, and
doing household work.
A comparison of this traditional observational study with the natural experiment by Lassen
(2005) offers important lessons. The assignment mechanism is unknown in both cases. Simi-
larly to the Lassen (2005) study, where the probability of each possible allocation of districts to
the decentralization condition is unknown, in the Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) study
we ignore the probability that each individual will receive a given endowment of money, edu-
cation, language ability, and free time. There is, however, a fundamental difference. In Lassen
(2005), the allocation of districts to the decentralization intervention was the result of a gov-
ernmental policy. This policy was decided by a third-party, not by the districts themselves
(though we cannot rule out that districts had some influence in determining their own assign-
ment). Moreover, the external mechanism that decided the allocation of districts has a time
stamp and is verifiable.
These two features apply to natural experiments generally, and translate into two con-
crete advantages over traditional observational studies. The time stamp allows the researcher
to identify a pre-treatment period, and distinguish it from the post-treatment period. And
the verifiability of the external mechanism can, in some cases, justify an uncounfoundedness
assumption. I discuss both issues below.
5.1 Pre-treatment period and falsification
In a natural experiment, the assignment mechanism depends on an external factor. As argued
at length above, knowledge of this external factor is not sufficient to fully know the probability
distribution of the assignment. However, because the occurrence of the external factor is
a necessary condition for the treatment to be assigned, the time period when the external
event occurs serves as a natural delimiter. Unlike traditional observational studies, natural
experiments allow the researcher to establish objectively the time period when treatment
assignment occurs, because she can record when the external intervention was initiated.
This treatment assignment time stamp is crucial for falsification purposes. Once the re-
26
searcher collects information about the moment when the treatment was given to the units, the
periods before and after the treatment assignment are easily established—the period before
the treatment is commonly referred to as the pre-treatment period. An important falsification
analysis is available if researchers can collect information on a set of covariates X measured
during the pre-treatment period. By virtue of having been measured in this period, these vari-
ables will be determined before the treatment is assigned and thus the effect of treatment on
them is zero by construction. Thus, the variables X can be used to implement a falsification
analysis that is common in the analysis of randomized experiments: by analyzing whether
the treatment has in fact no effect on the covariates, researchers can offer empirical evidence
regarding the comparability of treated and control groups.
As in randomized experiments, the usefulness of this so-called “covariate balance” analysis
depends on the type of variables that are included in X. The most convincing falsification
analysis will be one where these variables that are strongly correlated with both the outcome
and the factors that affect the propensity to receive the the externally-assigned treatment.10
On this aspect, natural experiments do not differ much from RCEs and RTPEs.
However, there is one crucial difference. The correct implementation of a covariate falsifica-
tion analysis depends on the assignment mechanism, which in a natural experiment is unknown.
When the assignment mechanism is equiprobable, the distribution of X is expected to be the
same when the entire control group is compared to the entire treatment group, and thus the
falsification test can be implemented with unadjusted covariate balance tests that compare all
treated units versus all control units.11 However, if the treatment assignment probabilities are
different for different subgroup of units, the proper implementation of a covariate balance test
requires to weight or stratify the analysis based on these probabilities. In natural experiments,
however, these probabilities are unknown, so such adjustment is unavailable.
This suggests that an unadjusted covariate balance test is a useful tool to establish the plau-
sibility of the equiprobable assignment assumption. For implementation, researchers should
assume that the assignment mechanism is equiprobable and test the hypothesis that the un-
adjusted distribution of X is equal in the treatment and control groups. If the hypothesis that
the treated and control covariate distributions are equal is rejected, then the assumption of
equiprobable assignment is unsupported by the data. This is an important first step to gain a
10For example, in the Lassen (2005) study, one could analyze the share of the population that is college-
educated, which is known to correlate with voter turnout (the outcome of interest), and is also correlated with
socio-economic indicators such as income and poverty that might make decentralization (the treatment) more
or less desirable.
11An equiprobable assignment is one in which every unit has the same probability of receiving treatment,
but not necessarily one in which this probability is equal to 50%. As long as this probability is constant for all
units, the distribution of covariates in the treatment and control group will be the same.
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deeper understanding of the assignment mechanism.
The implementation of this falsification analysis is straightforward in the Lassen (2005)
study. The decentralization intervention occurred in 1995 when the Copenhagen Munici-
pality Structural Commission selected the districts that would be decentralized. Thus, all
district-level variables collected before 1995 are pre-treatment and can be used in a falsifica-
tion analysis. This could include census counts, economic indicators, etc. In contrast, in the
Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995), the pre-treatment period is impossible to identify with
certainty because it is unclear when the treatments of time, money and civic skills are in fact
assigned. For example, if an individual reports high levels of civic skills as measured by a
vocabulary test, what exactly is the period before this skill was developed? We know that
language skills are susceptible to stimulation since an early age, and toddlers and even infants
who are exposed to rich language environments have stronger language skills. We cannot rule
out that people with high vocabulary skills have been exposed to this treatment since early
childhood. A similar argument can be applied to the money and time treatments. This im-
plies that a pre-treatment period is unavailable and all covariates are in fact post-treatment
covariates. Therefore, there are no covariates available with which to implement a falsification
analysis.
5.2 Verifiability of externality and unconfoundedness
When the empirical evidence shows that the distribution of relevant predetermined covariates
differs between the treatment and the control group, the assumption of equiprobable assign-
ment is implausible. This means that the data does not support the assumption that all
units were assigned to the treatment condition with the same probability. Without additional
knowledge, it is not possible to identify causal treatment effects in a design-based fashion.
However, the most convincing natural experiments might offer a reasonable justification for
the assumption that the assignment is unconfounded given some observable predetermined co-
variates. The credibility of this justification is based directly on the externality of the treatment
assignment that characterizes natural experiments. As I have defined it, a natural experiment
is a setting in which the treatment assignment mechanism is known to be probabilistic by
virtue of depending on an external factor. In some natural experiments, the researcher has
enough information about the variables on which the external intervention depended. In these
cases, the researcher might credibly assume that, after these variables are conditioned on, the
probability of treatment assignment is not a function of the units’ potential outcomes. The
credibility of such an assumption should be judged on a case-by-case basis.
For example, in the Lassen (2005) study, the exact functional form of the assignment mech-
28
anism is unknown, but a qualitative investigation of the decision-making process revealed that
the decision of which districts to decentralize was based on the districts’ population and so-
cioeconomic development, with the explicit goal of ensuring that the decentralized districts
were as diverse as the total population of districts in terms of these covariates. This feature of
the assignment, which is directly verifiable with qualitative information issued by the Copen-
hagen Municipal Commission, can be used as the basis for the unconfoundedness assumption
that the probability of decentralization is unrelated to the districts’ potential outcomes after
conditioning on population and socioeconomic development.
Note an important difference between the unconfoundedness assumption and the equiprob-
able assignment assumption: the latter is empirically testable, but the former is not. Because
covariate balance is an implication of an equiprobable assignment mechanism, we can use co-
variate balance tests to falsify the assumption that the assignment mechanism is equiprobable.
However, in the absence of additional assumptions, the unconfoundedness assumption is fun-
damentally untestable. This means that a justification for it has to rely more heavily on the
qualitative information about the assignment mechanism, and stands on weaker evidentiary
ground.
The assumption of unconfounded assignment is always strong, but on this respect natu-
ral experiments have an advantage over traditional observational studies: the dependence of
the assignment mechanism on external factors is verifiable. In the most convincing natural
experiments, researchers are able to verify that the process that governed the treatment as-
signment depended on external factors, and prior scientific knowledge coupled with qualitative
and/or qualitative data suggests that treatment assignment should be unrelated to potential
outcomes conditional on those factors. If the researcher is able to collect information on those
same factors and condition on them in the analysis, then the usual tools of program evalua-
tion based on unconfoundedness—parametric adjustment models, propensity score analyses,
matching estimators, etc.—are available for analysis.
Thus, in a convincing natural experiment, the researcher uses the available information
on the external assignment mechanism as a plausible basis to invoke an unconfoundedness
assumption. This is unavailable in a traditional observational study, where there is usually
no objective basis to claim that unconfoundedness holds for any set of covariates, given that
we fundamentally ignore how (and when) the treatment was assigned. For example, in the
Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) study, what covariates should we condition on before we
can assume that people with high levels of money, time and civic resources are comparable
to people who have low levels of those resources? Brady, Verba, and Schlozman condition on
citizenship status because they reasonably assume that it is a “prerequisite for voting and
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might affect other kinds of participation as well”. But, even putting aside the concerns about
establishing the pre-treatment period, we can imagine many other factors such as geographic
location, number of children, parents’ education, etc., that may affect both the propensity to
participate in politics and the amount of time, money, and resources available to an individual.
There is no objective information to guide the choice of the conditioning set.
The decision to participate in politics, since it is made privately and is entirely under the
control of each individual, is less transparent to the researcher than the decision to decentralize
districts in Copenhagen. Unlike the Copenhagen Municipal Commissions, which published
a report on the decentralization process, individual citizens do not write reports detailing
the process by which they arrived at the decision to participate in politics. This greater
transparency about the assignment mechanism, and the separation between the units receiving
the treatment and those assigning it, can imbue some natural experiments with a stronger
research design and more objective basis to invoke the necessary identification assumptions.
My choice of can in the prior sentence is deliberate, and should not be replaced by do. I
do not mean to claim that the “worst” natural experiment is always preferable to the “best”
traditional observational study. Some natural experiments blatantly violate the equiprobable
assignment assumption and provide a very weak basis for assuming unconfoundedness. Some
traditional observational studies are carefully conducted and contribute to our scientific knowl-
edge. My claims about a credibility hierarchy are made in the ceteris paribus spirit articulated
by Imbens (2010)—in a given study, it is preferable to have a verifiable conditioning set and
a clear time stamp attached to the treatment assignment, and no researcher would willingly
give up such information.
6 Recommendations for Practice
The preceding discussion suggests some general recommendations for empirical researchers
who wish to estimate and interpret causal effects based on natural experiments.
(1) Is the assignment probabilistic? The first step is to establish whether the assumption
of a probabilistic assignment is met for the universe of units that the researcher wishes to
analyze. As I have defined it, a crucial feature of a natural experiment is that its assignment
mechanism is probabilistic by virtue of an external event that is outside of the units’ direct
control. The researcher should establish whether it is in fact the case that all units to be
included in the study had a probability of receiving treatment strictly between zero and one.
If some units were certain to either be affected or not affected by the intervention, they should
be excluded from the study, as the usual causal parameters will not be identifiable. If some
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units are excluded, the researcher should redefine the parameter of interest and clarify in the
analysis that the reported effects are estimating the effect of the intervention only for units
whose probability of being treated was neither zero nor one. The researcher should carefully
characterize this new parameter.
The caveat is that the assumption of probabilistic treatment assignment is not directly
verifiable or testable, because untreated units could be untreated either because their ex-
ante treatment assignment probability is zero or because it is positive but the realization of
the assignment is the control condition. For this reason, researchers should use prior scientific
knowledge and/or qualitative and quantitative information regarding the external process that
assigned the treatment to justify the probabilistic assignment assumption.
(2) Is the assignment equiprobable? The second step is to assume that the assignment mech-
anism is equiprobable and test the hypothesis that the distribution of relevant pre-treatment
covariates is equal in the treatment and control groups. This falsification analysis starts
by selecting a group of relevant pre-treatment covariates X and testing the null hypothesis
that the means and other features of the distribution of these covariates are the same in
treated and control groups. If the hypothesis of covariate balance is not rejected, the analysis
can proceed under the equiprobable assignment assumption, using standard tools from the
analysis of randomized experiments (e.g., Athey and Imbens, 2017; Gerber and Green, 2012;
Imbens and Rubin, 2015)—with the caveat that in natural experiments, unlike in RCEs or
RTPEs, this assumption is not known to be true and its credibility might be disputed by other
analyses. If the hypothesis of covariate balance is rejected, then the assumption of equiprob-
able assignment is unsupported by the data. Of course, researchers should ensure that their
tests have enough statistical power to avoid mistakenly interpreting the failure to reject a false
null hypothesis of covariate balance as supportive of the equiprobable assignment assumption.
(3) Is the assignment unconfounded? An assignment mechanism that is not equiprobable
could still be unconfounded. When the data do not support the assumption of equiprobable
assignment, researchers should explore whether it is plausible to assume that there exists a
covariate-based adjustment that renders treated and control groups comparable. In this second
stage of falsification, researchers can use the external assignment mechanism of the natural
experiment to offer a plausible basis to adopt an unconfoundedness assumption. This justifica-
tion should be based on objective and verifiable information about the treatment assignment
mechanism that identifies a set of covariates that were explicitly used in the assignment, as
in the Lassen study. Assuming that the researcher has access to these covariates, the analysis
can proceed under the assumption of unconfounded given these covariates using standard esti-
mation and inference methods from the unconfoundedness toolkit (e.g., Abadie and Cattaneo,
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2018; Imbens and Rubin, 2015)—again, with the caveat that this assumption is not known to
be true and might be disputed by later analyses.
(4) Is the natural experiment of substantive interest? In most natural experiments, the treat-
ment that is assigned is not exactly the treatment that a researcher would have assigned if
she had been in charge of the execution of the study. This leads to very important and often
difficult issues of interpretation. Even if all the required identification assumptions are satis-
fied, the treatment effect that is identifiable by the design may not be the effect of scientific
interest.
Sekhon and Titiunik (2012) illustrate this point with a redistricting natural experiment.
Several researchers have used the periodic re-drawing of district boundaries to study the in-
cumbency advantage, comparing the vote share received by the same incumbent legislator in
areas that are new to her district versus areas that have been part of the district for a long
time. Even if precincts are randomly moved to new districts according to a known probability
distribution, this assignment would never achieve comparability between new and old voter
areas in terms of their prior history (e.g. party or race of prior incumbent), because new vot-
ers are coming from a different incumbent by construction. In terms of the prior discussion,
this occurs because the probability of old voters of being selected as new voters is zero, and
thus the overall assignment is not probabilistic. The natural experiment externally introduces
variation in the voters that an incumbent receives in her/his district. Whether this variation
is useful to study the incumbency advantage of interest to scholars of American politics is a
separate matter. Such issues of interpretation should be at the forefront of any analysis based
on natural experiments.
7 Conclusion
The literature has offered several definitions of a natural experiment, not necessarily consistent
with one another. I sought to partly resolve the ambiguity by going back to the definition of a
randomized controlled experiment, and contrasting the canonical natural experiment to it. As
I have defined it, a natural experiment is a study in which the treatment assignment mechanism
is neither designed nor implemented by the researcher, is unknown to the researcher, and is
probabilistic by means of an external event or intervention that is outside of the control of the
units who are the subject of the intervention.
In order to arrive at this definition, I have emphasized several conceptual distinctions. A
central conclusion is that a randomized controlled experiment’s defining feature is not that
the treatment assignment is random, in the sense of being a random variable with some dis-
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tribution, because this would imply that all interventions, programs, and individual decisions
ever taken are randomized experiments. That a citizen’s decision to vote is a random vari-
able does not imply that a comparison of voters and nonvoters is a randomized experiment.
The key is not that the treatment must have a distribution (all random variables do) but
rather that the experimenter must know what this distribution is. The power of a random-
ized controlled experiment is therefore not only in the randomization itself, but also in the
knowledge and properties of the assignment distribution that the randomization implies. In
a randomized controlled experiment, the unconfoundedness assumption guaranteed by the
physical randomization device is as crucial as the ex-ante unpredictability of each individual’s
treatment assignment. In contrast, natural experiments retain the unpredictability but discard
knowledge of the assignment mechanism and the unconfoundedness guarantees.
Because natural experiments have, by definition, a treatment assignment mechanism that is
unknown to the researcher, they rank—everything else equal—unambiguously below random-
ized controlled experiments in terms of credibility and reproducibility. Nonetheless, natural
experiments offer two important advantages over traditional observational studies. First, by
defining the moment when the intervention of interest occurs, they clearly demark a pre-
treatment period, which is essential to falsify the assumption of equiprobable assignment and
also to condition on covariates in a valid way. Second, in cases where the equiprobable assign-
ment assumption does not hold, the best natural experiments offer a plausible and verifiable
justification for an unconfoundedness assumption. Both the time stamp that delimits pre and
post treatment periods and the objective justification for the unconfoundedness assumption
are often lacking in traditional observational studies.
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